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Transnational Telecommunications Capital
Expanding From South Africa into Africa:
Adapting to African Growth and South
African Transformation Demands
Since 1994, Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) operating in post-Apartheid South
Africa have encountered exciting economic opportunities in a democratic country
eager for foreign direct investment (FDI). They also discovered a country that was
reconciling with the world after years of isolation, thus offering great opportunities to
expand their operations elsewhere in Africa. But while the booming
telecommunications market opened doors for new growth in SouthAfrica and beyond,
the new democracy also placed regulations aimed at advancing the goal of racial and
socioeconomic transformation on all companies operating in the country.
With the liberalization of mobile markets across Africa, investment opportunities
for fast-moving local and international telecommunication companies have also
opened up. This growth in telephony has been largely fuelled by mobile cellular
communications firms, as well as foreign capital’s drive to tap into new cellular
markets. In 2003, revenues in the African mobile communications sector broke the
US$10-billion barrier, with profits estimated at more than US$1 billion. (ITU 2004)
The remarkable growth of telecommunications in the region has generated immense
benefits for the operators (such as South Africa’s MTN, France’s Orange, Middle
East’s Celtel) and their major international suppliers of technology (such as Sweden’s
Ericsson, Germany’s Siemens and China’s Hua Wei).
Key issues that confront the expansion of businesses from post-Apartheid South
Africa are, firstly, the kind of impact South Africa’s transformation is having in Africa
through the expansion of foreign MNCs, and secondly, what can be learnt from this
renewed economic engagement. Focusing on a single case study, this paper examines
the way that the African expansion of Ericsson, a Swedish telecommunications
multinational, has been shaped by post-Apartheid transformation imperatives in South
Africa. Using SouthAfrica as a regional hub, Ericsson has expanded from SouthAfrica
into the African telecommunications market. I chose to highlight this firm for several
reasons: its major global market share as telecommunications infrastructure provider;
its return to post-Apartheid South Africa after being forced to leave in the 1960s; its
position as the leading provider of infrastructure for the South African – now Pan-
African – operator, MTN; and its fast-growing market share in the continent. It is my
contention here that the story of Ericsson in post-Apartheid South Africa is illustrative
of how MNCs are responding to South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment (BBBEE) strategy. The BBBEE objectives that characterize the post-
Apartheid transition have affected the way this multinational operates in the continent.
By looking at Ericsson’s regional growth in post-Apartheid South Africa, my aim is
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twofold: to examine the dynamics of international telecommunications capital
expanding inAfrica from SouthAfrica, and secondly, to understand how this company
is responding to SouthAfrica’s transformation demands.
In the first part of the paper, Ericsson’s expansion is contextualized in terms of the
burgeoning telephony industry in Africa. The second part shows how Ericsson’s re-
entry into South Africa is part of the larger flows of FDI into SA in the 1990s. As a key
element in South Africa’s economic transformation, (BB)BEE is an important
imperative placed on foreign MNCs by the SouthAfrican government, discussed in the
third section. This part of the paper also makes the historical link with other attempts at
black empowerment on the continent, particularly in Nigeria and Ghana. The fourth
section reports on the case of Ericsson – its experiences and challenges encountered in
this combination of localization and expansion.
I argue that, in terms of black empowerment, the company distinguishes between
its SouthAfrican and its otherAfrican operations, and presents a different rationale for
the way it operates in these divergent contexts. For most managers, SouthAfrica, given
its history, needs racially-based transformation in ownership while other African
countries do not. A different strategy is therefore required in these different contexts,
with transformation being a priority in the South African context. This approach has
organizational implications for the way the company expands, operates in SouthAfrica
and is illustrative of the dynamics of international telecommunications capital in the
region. The final section of the paper reflects on how regional dynamics are also
influenced by the organizational strategies of foreign, not only South African,
multinationals.
Drawing on secondary information on empowerment initiatives in Africa, this
paper provides background information on the expansion of mobile telephony on the
continent. Primary data were also collected from representatives of Ericsson, through
semi-structured interviews with fifteen international managers or directors. Six were
women, nine were men, ten were Europeans and five were Africans. I interviewed
managers based at the Johannesburg head office, as well as those based at the regional
hubs and country offices in Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, Botswana and Ghana.
Managers based in SouthAfrica had a broad regional exposure as they spent at least 50
percent of their time constantly on the move managing their accounts and costumers
around Sub-Saharan Africa. Only two of the interviewees manage only South African
business. This information as well as the secondary data on Ericsson illustrates the
company’s regional expansion and its responses to the BBBEE strategy in South
Africa. These interviews focus on the perceptions and experiences of managers and
they illuminate the Ericsson story and its relevance to the pivotal role played by foreign
multinationals operating out of SouthAfrica.
According to the United Nations data, SouthAfrica is amongst the leading recipients of
foreign direct investment (FDI) inAfrica. Notably, it is also one of the largest investors
in many other sub-Saharan countries. While post-Apartheid South Africa has
followed a pattern of liberalization of its economy, government emphasis on FDI can
be explained not only by the changing nature of the global economy, but also by the
political economy of transition, since attracting capital from overseas has become an
FDI and Telecommunications in Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica
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attractive strategy for the state. With this intersection of FDI and transformation
within South Africa’s post-1994 political economy, the role of MNCs in the country’s
development has become increasingly relevant.Although there is very little analysis of
the role of FDI in the racial transformation of societies, the abundant literature looking
at the links between FDI and development that includes socioeconomic
improvements, provides a framework to examine the role of MNCs in South Africa’s
transformation.
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the
flow of FDI to developing countries worldwide now overshadows official
development assistance by a wide margin, highlighting the need to address the use of
FDI as a tool for economic development. Both the 2006 Economic Report onAfrica by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and NEPAD (New Partnership
for Africa’s Development) advocate that FDI is a key to solving Africa’s economic
problems and a major stimulus for economic growth. But investment flows to Africa
have declined steadily. In the 1970s, Africa accounted for 25 percent of foreign direct
investment to developing countries. In 1992 it only accounted for 5.2 percent whereas
in 2000 it received 3.8 percent of the total FDI to the developing world. FDI triggers
technology spillovers, assists human capital formation, contributes to international
trade integration, helps create a more competitive business environment and enhances
enterprise development, according to these agencies. All of these factors are seen as
contributing to economic growth and considered a potent tool for alleviating poverty in
developing countries.
However, whether and to what extent MNCs facilitate such positive spillovers
varies according to the specific context and from sector to sector. According to
Mwalima, in many situations MNC’s activities reinforce dualistic economic structures
and acerbate income inequalities as they tend to promote the interests of a small
number of local factory managers and relatively well paid modern-sector workers
against the interests of the rest of the population by widening wage differentials.
Similarly, they tend to worsen the imbalance between rural and urban economic
opportunities by locating primarily in urban export enclaves and contributing to the
flow of rural urban migration. As Klein, Aaron and Hadjimichael explain, even some
expected benefits may prove elusive if, for example, the host economy, in its current
state of economic development, is not able to take advantage of the technologies or
know-how transferred through FDI.
Acknowledging that MNCs could use their economic power to influence
government policies in directions that usually do not favour development, Mwilima
emphasises the responsibility of governments to set the appropriate conditions for FDI
to contribute to development goals rather than just generating profits for the foreign
investor (Mwilima). Fundamentally, the magnitude of the benefits from FDI depends
on the efforts of host countries to put in place appropriate frameworks, according to
authors such as Klein,Aaron and Hadjimichael.
A more recent and controversial debate within the literature is on the role of MNCs
in alleviating poverty. For instance, C. K. Prahalad defends the idea that by designing
and developing products and services specifically catered for the needs of the poor, and
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argues that although the world’s poor are low in income, they are high in number – and
therefore represent a huge market opportunity for MNCs.
The idea of promoting socioeconomic change by reaping profits from those at base
of the economic pyramid may sit uncomfortably with more developmental social
goals. However, the expansion of mobile telephony into ruralAfrica demonstrates that
as the big telecommunication companies develop products and adapt services to cater
for the needs of the poor – Africa’s majority – they are providing a much needed
service. Major operators attending the 2007 AfricaCom conference agreed that their
growth potential in Africa lies in making mobile telephony more accessible and
affordable for the huge untapped market of lower-income consumers, particularly
those in rural areas. Safaricom’s rapid expansion of mobile network coverage in rural
Kenya since 2000 is a case in point. The private operator, driven by profits, is providing
telephony to a broader section of the population. As an IT research company explains,
operators in developing markets have successfully developed strategies and business
models enabling them to make healthy profits on low margin costumers. Although
theirs is clearly a profit-driven strategy to increase market share, MNCs
simultaneously provide an important service to Africa’s poor communities – through
mobile communications, banking for the un-banked, and community phones.
Although the provision of these services needs to be scrutinized and regulated by
governments, they are certainly responding to a need amongstAfrican citizens.
MNCs are active in the most dynamic sectors of Africa’s economy. They control
significant employment, capital and technology which in turn gives them tremendous
influence on development. Many MNCs are active in extractive industries, and
therefore are often heavily scrutinized in Africa and elsewhere. However, the
telecommunications sector is generally perceived as having a positive impact on the
development of host economies. This perception places a telecommunications MNC
such as Ericsson in a comfortable position within theAfrican FDI landscape.
According to Gray, it is not enough to look at the spread of mobile telephony to
understand the impact that the mobile phone has made. Besides providing many rural
areas with communications technology for the first time, the mobile phone has enabled
some users to participate in the broader economy. In Uganda and Kenya, for example,
farmers can now use their mobile phone to find out about the latest crop prices in
related markets. Instant and direct access to market prices increases their revenues,
provides them with valuable information to negotiate, and protects them from being
cheated by middlemen. In Tanzania, two thirds of a survey sample said the use of
mobile phones has meant a large saving in travel time and cost, and has helped small
businesses operate more effectively. In South Africa, 62 percent of small businesses
affirmed that they had increased their profits as a result of the mobile phone.
Telecommunication MNCs will play a major role in Africa's connectivity, access
and use of information and communications technologies (ICT) over the coming
years. Although according to Africa currently accounts for around
only one percent of multinational companies’ global sales – mostly from key markets
like South Africa – the continent also represents the ‘last frontier’ for companies to
achieve high growth and enjoy good return on investment. Therefore, the continent’s
ICT development will depend greatly on the ways in which these resources are used
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implement business strategies, and African governments regulate both national and
foreign telecommunications capital, will be particularly important.
Access to ICT has historically been very limited in Africa. By the beginning of
2001, the continent – home to around one in eight of the world’s people – had just under
one in 50 of the world’s fixed line subscribers, one in 60 of the world’s mobile cellular
subscribers, one of 70 of the world’s personal computers and only one in 80 of the
world’s Internet users. However, theAfrican telecommunications landscape has been
rapidly changing over the last two decades, transformed by new investments in mobile
telephony. While it took more than a hundred years to install 28 million fixed telephone
lines inAfrica, this technology has since been overshadowed by the stunning growth of
the mobile industry. The number of mobile phones on the continent overtook that of
fixed lines in 2001 and now outnumbers fixed lines by nearly five to one, with 137.2
million mobile subscribers in 2005. In 2003, almost 70 percent of allAfrican telephone
subscribers used mobiles. The ratio is even higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, where nine
out of every ten subscribers with access to a phone use a mobile. This is the highest
ratio of mobile to total telephone subscribers of any region in the world. It is estimated
that by the end of 2004, over 60 percent of the population inAfrica was within range of
a mobile signal. For many Africans today, mobile is the only form of telephone
communications they know – and perhaps may ever know.
However, and notwithstanding the benefits of the mobile boom, the high amount of
money that households put into mobile services remains problematic.According to the
ITU research, persons in countries such as Namibia, Ethiopia, and Zambia spend more
than 10 percent of their monthly household income on telephone services. Households
in SouthAfrica and Tanzania spend 6.8 and 5.9 percent, respectively. This compares to
an estimated three percent in most developed countries.
South Africa boasts a number of attractions for foreign investors. According to
Business Map Foundation data, the country has a long history of investments by
foreign MNCs which are an important source of new capital flows in recent years.
BusinessMap’s findings show that the country compares reasonably well in
institutional aspects of the investment climate. The factors ‘scoring’ the best in terms
of positively affecting investment decisions were the quality of South Africa's
infrastructure, the stability of the business environment, the economic policy
framework, political stability and the rate of economic growth. However, companies
operating in South Africa also expressed concerns over the country’s transformation
process, specifically the strategy for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE).
The 1994 elections in South Africa marked the end of minority rule and the beginning
of a new era of political, economic and social transformation. While political power
shifted from white to black hands without any systemic collapse, the economy
remained widely dominated by the white minority. Racial socioeconomic
transformation post-Apartheid has proven to be an enormous challenge, and has
remained a major commitment for the ANC government. The Broad-Based Black
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) strategy is the cornerstone of this process, and it
directly affects both national and international companies operating in South Africa.







Transformation and BEE in SouthAfrica andAfrica
107
TRANSNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPITAL EXPANDING
FROM SOUTH AFRICA INTO AFRICA
divide left by Apartheid by promoting the advancement of blacks within the economy.
Specific aims of the strategy include the development of a visible black middle class,
the improvement of skills within the black population, and increasing black ownership
and management of business and property.
Discussion about increased black participation in the mainstream South African
economy surfaced in the mid-1970s. After the 1976 riots, ‘black advancement’ was
formulated as a set of measures to be implemented by multinational corporations to
improve the conditions of employment of their black employees through the so-called
Sullivan Code. From 1990, the term ‘affirmative action’ was used to refer to strategies
to restore ‘historic imbalances’ in the SouthAfrican economy, but it was soon replaced
by the concept of ‘empowerment’. Since then, there have been a few such race-based
empowerment initiatives. The initial emphasis (early 1990s) of black empowerment
(then known as BEE) was overwhelmingly on equity transfer through government-
sanctioned BEE business transactions. However, these ‘BEE deals’ were criticized for
benefiting only a handful of individuals. Growing criticism and dissatisfaction with
BEE policies provoked a re-examination of the strategy and of the true meaning of
Black Empowerment.
What emerged was the concept of BEE as a broader process of involving black
people in the economy, rather than simply transferring assets. This approach is
encapsulated in the government’s current Broad Based Black Economic
Empowerment Strategy (BBBEE). The revised strategy entails a scorecard system and
returns ‘empowerment’ to its true meaning, namely to encompass: affirmative action
(or ‘employment equity’); skills development; training; encouragement of small black
business through targeted procurement polices; and social investment. The (BB)BEE
Codes, first released in 2005, serve as guidelines for the implementation of the BBBEE
Act (2003) and identify three kinds of components and beneficiaries. (See Table 1).
The measurement of empowerment across all sectors is guided by the so-called
‘Generic Scorecard’, which identifies seven elements of transformation. Each element
is weighted and allows companies to score points by reaching certain targets. A
company’s score out of 100 determines their level of BEE contribution; so a ‘Level
One’ company is one that meets 100 percent or more of the elements, while a ‘Level
Eight’ company earns just over 30 percent of the total possible score, and is the lowest
level before being considered non-compliant in BBBEE standards. However, because
no institution has been yet recognized as an accreditation agency, a uniform and




Table 1: Components and Beneficiaries of BEE
Component Beneficiary
Direct Empowerment Equity holders, executives and other owners and
managers of economic resources
Human Resource Development Employees and job seekers
Indirect Empowerment Suppliers, communities and other relevant external
stakeholders
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. The Codes of Good Practice on Broad-Based
Black Economic Empowerment. 2004
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Table 2: The Generic Scorecard
Element Weighting
Ownership 20 percent
Management and Control 10 percent
Employment Equity 15 percent
Skills Development 15 percent
Preferential Procurement 20 percent
Enterprise development 15 percent
Residual (Social Economic) 5 percent
Source: DTI Codes of Good Practice
While South Africa’s government plays a central role in providing a framework for
(BB)BEE, each company is responsible for its own implementation and compliance.
Enforcement has been left mainly to the forces of the market, with the private sector
playing a leading role particularly through the formulation of industry transformation
charters. Since one set of rules cannot cover all circumstances in all industries, sectoral
charters cater for the variety of empowerment requirements, depending on sectoral
business environments and government priorities. The sector charters gave more
certainty to the process and have enabled companies to measure their own progress in
BEE terms by establishing more specific benchmarks per industry.
Indeed as Businessmap explains, empowerment is primarily driven by
government’s enormous buying power through the procurement of goods and
services, particularly in ICT, health, education and construction. Companies that do
not satisfy certain empowerment requirements will not secure contracts to supply the
State. Although the scorecard and charter apply also to foreign companies,
enforcement is somehow more flexible. In the past, where government has sought to
bring (usually international) equity partners into what it regards as strategic assets,
such as ICT, the empowerment requirements on the partner have been constrained. For
example, when 30 percent of State telecommunications utility Telkom was sold off, the
bidders were not under any obligation to have empowerment companies as equity
partners in their consortia. Rather, the State took responsibility for transferring some of
the equity ownership to disadvantaged South Africans through a retail offering. The
empowerment obligations on the buyers in the Telkom deal centred on training and
affirmative action, with a small percentage (three percent) set aside for an
empowerment entity.
Although the empowerment path chosen by theANC in SouthAfrica is particularly
responsive to the country’s history, similar initiatives have been tried elsewhere in
Africa.Asimilar process emerged two generations ago in decolonising WestAfrica.At
that time, as Decker explains, foreign companies encountered rising pressure to
change the composition of their workforce and to promote local ownership and
management of their operations. In 1960s Nigeria, according to Amao, the
government’s perception of foreign MNCs was laden with distrust. Leaders perceived
the process of as a way of asserting the nation’s right to exercise
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exercise the right to naturalize such investments. From 1969, the government forced
Nigerian equity ownership as a mechanism to retain profits in the country and also
mandated Nigerian ownership and management control, particularly over
manufacturing firms. It was a policy designed essentially to ‘promote an indigenous
capitalist class’.
But in reality, these indigenization efforts did not broaden the basis of Nigerian
participation in the economy. Technical, entrepreneurial and managerial expertise
among average Nigerians remained relatively limited, while an élite of Nigerian
businessmen and the Nigerian government benefited from that transfer. As admitted
in the ‘Report on Vision 2010 Economic Direction’, the process of indigenisation did
not generally shift broad economic control to Nigerians, even as it did reduce foreign
direct investment and interest in Nigeria.
A similar process was evident in the Ghana. As Decker explains, the lack of
representation of Ghanaians in high-ranking positions in a private sector dominated by
foreign firms made companies vulnerable to public criticism and regulation. The
process of – training and promoting black African staff to managerial
levels – became the key theme of staff development and recruitment from the 1950s up
until the 1970s in the region.
Contrasting with otherAfrican experiences of economic transformation, (BB)BEE
in South Africa has not been aimed at terminating foreign control of business. I would
argue the role of the state has also been limited. The South African strategy, according
to Verhoef, has entailed a collaborative approach to empowerment, and foreign or
‘alien’ investors have not been driven out of the economy by means of timetables for
implementation. Also, numerous attempts have been made to sustain confidence and
cooperation internationally and from within the South African business sector,
including foreign MNCs. The crux of South Africa’s empowerment policy has not
been the expulsion of foreign and white investors, but rather the integration of the
black majority into the mainstream economy by facilitating the transfer and control
from white SouthAfricans to black SouthAfricans.
However, from the beginning of South Africa’s (BB)BEE rollout, the lack of a
clearer regulatory framework for transformation affected the confidence and
cooperation with MNCs. The MNCs’ initial reservations towards the BEE strategy
soon translated in a lack of support for this policy. Business Map interviews with 25
MNCs in South Africa illustrate these firms’ confusion and concerns about BEE
compliance. Resistance existed particularly in relation to the transfer of equity, as
foreign companies did not want to ‘give away’ shares in their companies. While BEE
did not involve actually giving away part of the company, in most cases when
undertaking a BEE deal, the full economic value of the percentage sold was not to be
received. There was either an actual discount, or shareholders were required to
subsidise the deal, most often through financing structures facilitated by the firm
selling the equity.
So while the collaborative and consultative nature of the implementation of new
broad-based black empowerment efforts could set the programme in South Africa
apart from the general trend in African states, it remains problematic for an MNC to
be fully compliant and contribute meaningfully to development and transformation
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From SouthAfrica toAfrica: Getting the 'SouthAfrican Way' Into Ericsson
My role has been to get the ‘SouthAfrican way’ into the company – (Ericsson’s manager
for (BB)BEE)
While post-Apartheid South Africa has been eager to welcome international capital, it
is also fully committed to the country’s transformation, and expects businesses to
comply with its Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) strategy.
Ericsson has re-structured its local operations to better respond to the challenges of
dealing simultaneously with the continuous market growth in Africa, while also
participating in South Africa’s transformation. In 2008 the company divided its
operations into two entities: Ericsson South Africa (ESA) and Ericsson Sub-Saharan
Africa (ASL). The split of the company apparently responded to two main issues: one,
to improve their BEE profile so that they can access more business within South
Africa; and two, to have separate structures for their South African and regional
businesses outside of South Africa. Under the new setup, the regional company – not
bound by the same BBBEE restrictions – will not invest resources and time complying
with South African requirements that do not provide a direct benefit to the African
business. The regional business will also be better positioned to return more of its
profits to its global shareholders.
According to the company’s official announcement, the restructuring of Ericsson
South Africa responds to the need to establish a dedicated team to support its South
African market within a context of growth and increasing competition. This approach
has been also implemented in Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya. The local company is to
focus entirely on the South African market and will continue to be an entity driven by
local skills, wholly embracing (BB)BEE and transformation. In parallel, Ericsson sub-
Saharan Africa will provide support to costumers across the rest of the market unit as
well as costumers in South Africa. Both entities will continue to reside in the current
Johannesburg offices.
Ericsson’s operations in South Africa generate an annual turnover above R35
million. Under South African (BB)BEE regulations, this means the company must
comply with all seven elements of the scorecard, be verified once a year (according to
the codes), and follow the ICT Charter as a guideline. As of September 2008, the
company’s BEE score stood at 73,72 percent, which placed them on a ‘Level Four’ of
BBBEE recognition. Ericsson scored the maximum score on Preferential
Procurement, Enterprise Development and Socioeconomic Development. Ownership
is also high (18,56 out of 20), followed by Employment Equity (10,76 out of 15).
However, the company scored poorly in Management Control (5,44 out of 10) and
particularly in Skills Development (2,09 out of 10).
Ericsson is a global organization which dates back to 1876 and operates in over 140
countries, of which 43 are in the Sub-Saharan Africa Market Unit (MUSA). Its
development as a multi-national corporation with subsidiaries in other countries dates
back to its early years of operation. Today, the company serves more than 600
customers in over 175 countries. Their main sales by business activities for 2007 were
Mobile Networks, Professional Services and Fixed Networks. According to the
company’s annual report, in 2006 it deployed several rural networks – bringing its
technology to more people in more parts of the world than ever before. Net sales for the
39
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year 2007 were US$2.6 billion with a global employee headcount of 74,011. The
company divides its reporting by five regions: North America; Latin America; Asia;
Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe: and, finally, Middle East andAfrica.
Ericsson’s history in Africa dates back to the nineteenth century. The company
began operations in South Africa around 1897. While it continued some operations
elsewhere in Africa during the twentieth century, the company’s presence was
interrupted in South Africa in 1960, when the Swedish government prohibited
companies from doing business in the country during Apartheid. In addition, the
company’s business model changed dramatically since the 1980s – when its operations
throughout Africa were managed from offices in Sweden, Spain and Italy – as the
telecommunications boom called for a more active local presence on the continent.
When Swedish and international limitations on business in South Africa eased in the
1990s, Ericsson returned to the new market of a democratic and post-Apartheid
environment. South Africa’s advanced infrastructure, emerging economy, and
corporate footprint were all central for Ericsson's success in the country, and for its
regional expansion inAfrica.
Its breakthrough started in 1994, when South Africa licensed cellular telephony.
Ericsson became then the sole supplier of GSM network infrastructure to MTN South
Africa. Ericsson quickly launched operations in Johannesburg and soon after the
company fanned out into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Customers in Africa now
include major pan-African mobile operators such as MTN Group, Celtel, Vodacom,
and Econet Wireless Group; large cellular networks such as Safaricom in Kenya; and
fixed-line operators such as Namibia Telecom, Botswana Telecommunications
Corporation and South Africa’s Telkom. Currently, 25 percent of the company’s
business in South Africa is held by local entities: The Sisa Bikitsha Family Trust owns
five percent, while 8 Mile Investments (another small entity) owns 20 percent plus one
vote/share. Two out of the five members of Ericsson's local board are so-called
previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs).
After Ericsson re-entered SouthAfrica in 1994, the focus of its Johannesburg office
was on operations within South Africa, particularly to building MTN’s local network.
However, MTN’s African expansion and other business opportunities in the region
meant Ericsson secured five new contracts between 1996 and 1997: two in Botswana,
one in Zimbabwe and one with MTN Uganda and one with MTN Rwanda. In 2002, the
Market Unit for Sub-Saharan Africa (MUSA) was established in Johannesburg. The
Market Unit manages a growing number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with
operations concentrated on sales, marketing and services. There are now four hubs:
Kenya (servicing East Africa); Nigeria (servicing English West Africa): Senegal
(servicing French West Africa); and South Africa (servicing the Southern Africa
region). Although Ericsson’s hub in Senegal is smaller and less structured than the
office in South Africa, but has grown quickly: it opened with five staff in 2007 and in
2008 will hire about 100 employees to support 18 countries in that region. SouthAfrica
is also the head office of the Market Unit for all of Sub-Saharan Africa, serving as a
regional hub, and hosting a pool of specialists who constantly move around countries.
MTN provided the major local business opportunity for Ericsson, but the company
has not been as successful with other South African costumers. According to some
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and late stages of transformation. Initially, as Telkom’s white management structure
remained tied to international companies who were not forced by their governments to
leave South Africa during Apartheid (such as Siemens), Ericsson found itself in a
disadvantaged position. More recently, as management became more (BB)BEE
driven, actively pushing for a more representative managerial work force, Ericsson's
transformation achievements (such as ownership) have fallen short.
The company also remains very active in countries such as Botswana, Tanzania and
Mozambique, and is busy opening new country offices such as Zambia, Madagascar
and Uganda. The opening of Ericsson’s new office in Madagascar was driven from
South Africa and responds to the need to be closer to customers. In this case, it also
responds to the need to provide additional support to emerging operators, such as
Madagascar’s Telma. As explained by two key account managers in Madagascar, this
has been a challenging experience due to the speed of the market growth; for the first
six months of Ericsson’s presence in the country, 50 people stayed at a hotel in
Antananarivo working from the Telma office. It is also challenging due to the relative
immaturity of the client company. As Ericsson’s managers explain, while in other
markets Ericsson’s role ends when the equipment is sold, in Madagascar, as with many
other operators in Africa, the company often has to go step further constantly helping
operators to run the networks.
Similarly, the mid-2007 opening of the Zambia office was motivated by the need to
be closer to the client company, Celtel. Managers in Zambia also support the
company’s business in Malawi and facilitated the opening of the Uganda office in early
2008. The speed and dynamics of this expansion are illustrative of the flexibility and
rapid growth of the sector and the company itself.
The experience and perceptions of managers working across the region speaks to the
complex location of South Africa within Africa and the mixed ideas and
representations of race and nationality. Managers were perceived differently on the
grounds of being – or not being – Africans. As four managers highlighted, often the
perceptions were contradictory; while local costumers expected Africans represented
within the company’s workforce and at certain costumer meetings, they preferred
Europeans to discuss core technical issues and expected Europeans to provide
solutions, as white faces inspired trust in the quality of the products and services of the
company.
All managers hesitated to define South Africa as part of Africa, while 11 out of 12
agreed that the country, as an economic power in the region, needs to play a leading role
in the development of its African neighbours. South African managers were
particularly supportive of this approach, and indicated that they saw their country as an
example to be followed in the continent. All managers were proud to work for the
company and to be part of the telecommunications industry, particularly in Africa, and
11 out of 12 believed that their company was a better corporate citizen than their
competitors inAfrica.All managers interviewed had a good knowledge on the concept
and importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).A full 10 out of 12 believed
that MNCs had a role to play in the development of host African economies, most
pointing out that their business already contributed to developmental efforts.
Managers’ perceptions, managers’ realities
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Over the last few years, as Ericsson’s regional structure has been transformed into
an integrated system, the regional hubs serve as resource centres, allowing Ericsson’s
business to be closer to costumers. While the hubs are independent, they are fairly
integrated with the head office in Johannesburg. According to Ericsson’s managers,
the establishment of the Market Unit for Sub-SaharanAfrica (MUSA) in Johannesburg
was a rational decision based on the availability of infrastructure, good connecting
flights, a skilled workforce and a friendly environment for expatriates in the city.
Some managers calculated the company’s growth at about 300 percent between
2003 and 2007. The company opened with 70 employees, had a headcount of 240
employees in 2002 and now 627 employees sit in South Africa. This does not include
the more than 700 employees working at the other countries within the Market Unit.As
the company has been rapidly expanding, all managers highlighted the overwhelming
increase of workload; some even noted the growth probably surprised top
management, as the company sometimes struggles to keep up with business. Most of
the international managers who came to South Africa temporarily have had to extend
their contracts unexpectedly and expand regions of operations at an incredibly fast
pace. Managers are required to be constantly on the move in between different
countries and dealing with an increasing number of accounts.
Although the expectation of all managers is that the office for the market unit will
remain in South Africa, a top manager of the regional business said this has been
questioned following past frustrations with the way certain aspects of the South
Africa’s (BB)BEE strategy have been managed.Amain frustration was the lack of ICT
knowledge and business commitment demonstrated by some of the new shareholders.
The fact that meetings were often used to discuss empowerment administrative issues
and not business concerns frustrated some members of the board and management.
Managers pointed out that South Africa became a marginal source of profits, with the
opportunities for the fastest growth located elsewhere in Africa. This put Ericsson and
its Market Unit for Sub-SaharanAfrica in an odd situation as the country office clearly
became the resource centre for the rest of the region with most business activities and
income coming from accounts in other African countries and not from South Africa.
Although any relocation seems improbable in the near future, the company is indeed
transforming, both as a response to market needs in the region and more increasingly to
SouthAfrica’s transformation demands.
According to most managers, the company’s (BB)BEE strategy has not been
replicated in its operations elsewhere in Africa, since it is not required nor enforced
elsewhere. Importantly, more than half the managers interviewed said they saw no
reason for the application of such a strategy in other African countries. Even if all
interviewees strongly agreed that (BB)BEE was the right thing to do, they also
emphasized that it was only applicable to South Africa given its particular history of
Apartheid. Remarkably, South African managers were much more supportive of the
need to apply (BB)BEE in otherAfrican countries.
Under the scorecard’s assessment, Ericsson’s weakest showing is in its skills
development programmes.Aclear link between (BB)BEE and skills development was
only identified by two managers, and although all managers agreed on their personal
power to contribute to skills development, all of them said they lack the time to embark
on such development. The managers were all critical of the lack of leadership from the
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company’s Human Resources department in this regard, even if they also pointed out
that it is ultimately up to them to make any skills transfer possible. The company has
embarked in 2008 on a Skills Development Project. They hope to develop a better
strategy and find better mechanisms to capture and report on this element. Even if they
spent major resources the previous years they did not have the mechanism in place to
track and monitor this expenditure. They have now appointed a Skills-Development
Coordinator and started collaborating with the Skills Education Training Authorities
(SETA).
Employment equity is a second (BB)BEE element that Ericsson needs to improve,
according to the scorecard, though the company’s score has improved since the
division from 7,63 to 10,76 out of a possible 15. Some of the managers surveyed said
the company is committed to this element, but also feels committed to follow corporate
policy. One top regional manager pointed to ‘the Swedish way’ of selecting the best
person for the position based on their personal capacity, regardless of their colour.
Some managers added that complying with this Employment Equity element has been
challenging, due to South Africa’s scarcity of skills and heavy competition between
existing companies for the small number of qualified individuals.As the BEE manager
explains, it is challenging to get the right numbers of employees and to plan for skills
development around these resources when poaching between companies is so
common. In her view, compliance with employment equity is something good, but
without a strong skills development foundation it will fail and only a small pull of
‘untouchables’ who are always on the move will be created.
Most challenging for Ericsson in the employment equity element has been the
effect of the rapid growth of telecommunications in Africa, as this has been managed
from their previously unified office in Johannesburg. As many expatriates managing
the growing regional market are housed in the South African offices – even if they are
not dealing with the SA business – they automatically affected the statistics on
previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs) employed at Ericsson before the
division. Furthermore, their overall EE score is set to worsen, as a growing number of
international experts are being brought in to South Africa to manage the company’s
growth in the region. Although the company’s recent regional growth has benefited
from its location within South Africa, Ericsson’s compliance with empowerment
regulations is not having a direct impact outside SouthAfrica’s borders.
Notwithstanding the company’s good score for BBBEE indicators on business
ownership, this element remains problematic.According to a top manager, the transfer
to local ownership remains a challenge due to the lack of resources from blacks, as well
as so-called ‘fronting’ practices that have been created to exploit the (BB)BEE
policies. These ‘fronting’ businesses make it hard for companies like Ericsson to find
shareholders who could both add value to the business while truly contributing to
broad-based empowerment. In some managers’ view, the broader black population of
South Africa is not benefiting from the transfer of ownership because very few people
have the money to invest in the industry.
Furthermore, while BBBEE entails a more comprehensive approach to black
economic empowerment, perceptions of (BB)BEE among the company’s managers –
and the business’s response – still concentrate on ownership issues. All managers
interviewed identified the transfer of ownership as the cornerstone of the strategy.
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Only four out of 12 identified the strategy as a programme to address the imbalances of
the past and to distribute wealth in a more fair way. Notably, only two managers
interviewed included the broader elements of BBBEE, such as preferential
procurement, in their definition.
Under Ericsson’s newly divided South African and regional structure, the Sub-
Saharan Africa office managing the African market will still remain a South African
registered company, and will need to comply with Department of Labour requirements
on employment equity and skills development. However, it will not need to meet the
requirements of the five other elements of the scorecard. Consequently, because local
shareholding applies only to the company doing business in South Africa, the profits
for the BEE shareholders will most certainly be reduced significantly, as dividends will
now exclude the fast growing African market. Under this new structure, local
shareholders will be under greater pressure to improve business within South Africa if
they want to keep benefiting from high dividends, while Ericsson could send more
profits back to Stockholm for distribution to global shareholders. Overall, as the BEE
profile of the regional entity will be irrelevant to their customers outside of South
Africa, the pressure to comply will be minimal for this entity.
Although Ericsson could certainly be criticized for the decreased dividends for the
local shareholders, this is not likely to have much impact on their contribution to broad
empowerment within South Africa. Although South African shareholders will no
longer reap the benefits of the African telecommunications growth, they will still gain
from the South African operations. Furthermore the company is now looking at
increasing the local ownership for the South African entity through an employee
shareholder scheme and has increasingly become more consistent with its skills
development strategy. As the South African entity is under greater pressure and now
greater freedom to improve its BEE score, it could be expected that they will be more
committed to local empowerment. Nevertheless, at this point in time these are just
assumptions and the real impact of the split could just be evaluated in the years to
come.
The combination of African growth in the telecommunications sector, the power of an
ICT multinational, and the (BB)BEE regulations within SouthAfrica are not providing
financial gains for regular Africans, are not affecting the operations of MNCs in a
significant way, and have not provided broad economic transformation within South
Africa. South Africa boasts a number of attractions for foreign investors, placing it in
an advantage position in the African context. The dynamics of telecoms in Africa and
of Ericsson’s regional operations in and operating from SouthAfrica suggest that there
are several links between SouthAfrica, international capital, andAfrica’s development
that require further research. A thorough evaluation of (BB)BEE's impact – especially
of local ownership, and the resultant generation of profits for a small group of
shareholders – is required, particularly for MNCs based in South Africa and rapidly
expanding intoAfrica.
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Although the economic importance of MNCs has been identified by several
African governments over the last decades, governments seem to be failing in the
implementation of mechanisms that envision a broader contribution from these
companies to the positive transformation of host economies. Neither indigenization
nor Africanization experiments seem to have provided a broader framework to
facilitate transformation through the systematic transfer of knowledge, development
of smaller enterprises and contributions to social and economic upliftment as the
BBBEE does in South Africa, even if not specifically aimed at MNCs. As
transformation initiatives seem to be broadly supported when there is a clear
justification for it, like South Africa’s history of Apartheid, any efforts for MNCs to
comply with (BB)BEE or any other local regulation need to be enforced through a
combination of instrumental elements (provide profit) and ethical ones (is the right
thing to do). Without a combination of these two, they are unlikely to translate into
sustainable change.
Notwithstanding government efforts in SouthAfrica to make its (BB)BEE strategy
more comprehensive, the focus on equity remains. This has diverted the attention away
from the so-called ‘soft issues’ of economic empowerment, such as the development of
human capital, which are central for long-term sustainable development and where
MNCs have a central role to play. The fact that all managers acknowledge their power
to have an impact on host economies (through, for instance, skills development),
suggests that any meaningful transformation in South Africa and in the continent
requires the buy-in from management. It is human agency that in the end will facilitate
the means and resources for transformation.
Ericsson’s split of its SouthAfrican-based operations into two separate companies,
as well as its rapid expansion in Africa, demonstrates the great flexibility of capital to
adapt to local realities. It also shows that African countries still need to learn how to
simultaneously collaborate with and regulate capital, particularly strategic capital in
dynamic sectors, such as ICT. While MNCs find creative ways to avoid extra costs on
their operations and on their capacity to improve profits, African countries still
struggle to regulate capital’s behaviour to serve local needs and benefit from the
wealth of the continent. The injustices of a racially-divided colonial past probably still
dominate public mindsets and policies, and this may prevent states to envision
innovative long-term empowerment strategies that are needed for transformation and
development. If empowerment efforts are guided by the belief that the ‘colour’ of
capital is what matters and not the way in which it behaves, this will be highly
problematic for achieving socioeconomic change in South Africa or elsewhere. The
difference between being a ‘black’ and an ‘empowered’ entity needs to be emphasized
in the African context for real transformation to take place. All capital – black, white,
yellow or blue – needs to be responsive to development needs.
In a capitalist twenty-first century, the first priority of international capital and
MNCs is to maximize profits, even if in the case of ICT, it also has a secondary
outcome of contributing to development through growth and innovation. On the other
hand, a key role of governments is to successfully regulate this capital and maximize
this growth and innovation in ways that benefit the majority of its own people. Citizens
also have an important role to play in holding both capital and governments
accountable. If capitalism has broadly reduced citizens to consumers, citizens must
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then become central forces of change through their power as consumers and
shareholders.
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